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I
t is now known that the public’s M2 demand experienced a leftward shift
in the early 1990s. Since about 1990 M2 growth has been weak relative
to what is predicted by standard money demand regressions. It is widely
believed that this shift in money demand reﬂected the public’s desire to redirect
savings ﬂows from bank deposits to long-term ﬁnancial assets including bond
and stock mutual funds. Recognizing this, policymakers have not paid much
attention to M2 in the short-run formulation of monetary policy since July of
1993.1
In this article, I review the recent behavior of M2 demand. I then evaluate
the hypothesis that the recent shift in M2 demand can be explained if we
allow for the effect of the long-term interest rate on money demand. The long-
term interest rate supposedly captures household substitutions out of M2 and
into long-term ﬁnancial assets. The evidence here indicates that a standard M2
demand regression augmented to include the bond rate spread can account for
most of the “missing M2” since 1990 if the estimation includes the missing
The author wishes to thank Robert Hetzel, Roy Webb, and Alex Wolman for many helpful
comments. The views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond or the Federal Reserve System.
1 See Greenspan (1993). The issue of the stability of money demand is central in assessing
M2’s usefulness for formulating policy. If M2 weakens, policymakers have to determine whether
this weakness has resulted from a shift in money demand or whether it indicates that the Fed
has been supplying an inadequate amount of money to the economy. If it’s the latter, weak M2
growth may portend weakness in the economy.
To remind readers, the current deﬁnition of M2 includes currency, demand deposits, other
checkable deposits, savings deposits, small-denomination time deposits, retail money market mu-
tual funds and overnight repurchase agreements and Eurodollar deposits.
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M2 period. Furthermore, changes in the missing M2 are highly correlated with
changes in household holdings of bond and stock mutual funds from 1990 to
1994. This evidence lends credence to the view that the steepening of the yield
curve in the early 1990s encouraged households to substitute out of M2 and
into other ﬁnancial assets and that part of this missing M2 ended up in bond
and stock mutual funds.
However, a few caveats suggest caution in interpreting the twin role of
the long-term interest rate and the growth of the mutual fund industry in in-
ﬂuencing money demand. One is that the bond rate has no predictive content
for M2 demand in the pre-missing M2 period. And during the past two years,
1995 and 1996, actual M2 growth has been in line with that predicted by the
money demand regression estimated with and without the bond rate. Hence,
the result that the bond rate can account for the missing M2 from 1990 to 1994
is interesting, but it does not necessarily indicate the presence of the systematic
inﬂuence of the yield curve on M2 demand. The other caveat is that household
holdings of bond and stock mutual funds continued to increase in 1995 and
1996, and that increase has not come at the expense of weak M2 growth. In
fact, the strong correlation noted above between the missing M2 and household
holdings of bond and stock mutual funds disappears when post-’94 observations
are included. This result indicates that changes in household holdings of bond
and stock mutual funds do not necessarily imply instability in M2 demand.
Taken together, one interpretation of this evidence is that special factors,
such as the unusual steepening of the yield curve in the early ’90s and the
increased availability and liquidity of mutual funds since then, caused the pub-
lic to redirect part of savings balances from bank deposits to bond and stock
mutual funds. Those factors probably have not changed the character of M2
demand beyond causing a one-time permanent shift in the level of M2 balances
demanded by the public.2 The result that the leftward shift in M2 demand ended
two years ago should now be of interest to monetary policymakers.
The plan of this article is as follows. Section 1 presents the standard M2
demand regression and reviews the econometric evidence indicating the exis-
tence of the missing M2 since 1990. Section 2 presents an explanation of the
missing M2 and Section 3 examines the role of the bond rate in explaining the
missing M2. Section 4 contains concluding observations.
2 Other special factors that have usually been cited are resolution of thrifts by the Reso-
lution Trust Corporation; the credit crunch; the downsizing of consumer balances accomplished
by using M2 balances to pay off debt; rising deposit insurance premiums and the imposition of
new, high-capital standards for depositories (resulting in a decreasing proportion of intermediation
through the traditional banking sector); and so on. But none of these other special factors offers a
satisfactory explanation of the missing M2 from 1990 to 1994 as does the steepening of the yield
curve. See Duca (1993), Darin and Hetzel (1994), and Feinman (1994) for a further discussion
of these special factors.                  
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1. A STANDARD M2 DEMAND EQUATION AND
ITS PREDICTIVE FAILURE IN THE EARLY 1990S
An M2 Demand Model
The money demand model that underlies the empirical work here is in error-
correction form and is reproduced below (Mehra 1991, 1992):
mt = a0 + a1yt + a2(R ¡ RM2)t + Ut and (1)










b3s¢(R ¡ RM)t¡s + ¸Ut¡1 + ²t, (2)
where m is real M2 balances; y is real GDP; R is a short-term nominal interest
rate; RM2 is the own rate on M2; U and ² are the random disturbance terms; and
¢ is the ﬁrst-difference operator. All variables are in their natural logs except
interest rates. Equation (1) is the long-run equilibrium M2 demand function and
is standard in the sense that the public’s demand for real M2 balances depends
upon a scale variable measured by real GDP and an opportunity cost variable
measured as the difference between a short-term nominal rate of interest and
the own rate of return on M2. The parameter a1 measures the long-run income
elasticity and a2 is the long-run opportunity cost parameter. Equation (2) is
the short-run money demand equation, which is in a dynamic error-correction
form. The parameter bis (I = 2,3) measures short-run responses of real M2 to
changes in income and opportunity cost variables. The parameter ¸ is the error-
correction coefﬁcient. It is assumed that if variables in (1) are nonstationary
in levels, they are cointegrated (Engle and Granger 1987). The presence of
the error-correction mechanism indicates that if actual real money balances are
high relative to what the public wishes to hold (Ut¡1 > 0), then the public
will be reducing its holdings of money balances. Hence the parameter ¸ that
appears on Ut¡1 in (2) is negative.
The long- and short-run money demand equations given above can be
estimated jointly. This is shown in (3), which is obtained by solving for Ut¡1
in (1) and substituting in (2) (Mehra 1992):










+ d1mt¡1 + d2yt¡1 + d3(R ¡ RM2)t¡1 + ²t, (3)
where d0 = b0 ¡ ¸a0; d1 = ¸; d2 = ¡¸a1; and d3 = ¡¸a2. As can be seen,
the long-term income elasticity can be recovered from the long-run part of
the money demand equation (3), i.e., a1 is d2 divided by d1. If the long-term                 
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income elasticity is unity (a1 = 1 in [1]), then this assumption implies the
following restriction on the long-run part of equation (3):
d1 + d2 = 0. (4)
Equation (4) says that coefﬁcients that appear on yt¡1 and mt¡1 sum to zero. The














. If the same scale variable appears in the long-
and short-run parts of the model, then a convergence condition can be imposed
on equation (3) to ensure that one gets the same point-estimate of the long-run
scale elasticity. The convergence condition implies another restriction (5) on




















That is, coefﬁcients that appear on ¢mt¡s and ¢yt¡s in (3) sum to unity.
Equation (3) can be estimated by ordinary least squares or by instrumental
variables if income and/or opportunity cost variables are contemporaneously
correlated with the disturbance term.
An Estimated Standard M2 Demand Regression: 1960Q4 to 1989Q4
Panel A in Table 1 presents results of estimating the standard money demand
regression (3) over the pre-missing M2 period, 1960Q4 to 1989Q4. Regressions
are estimated using the new, chain-weighted price and income data.3,4 I present
3 The empirical work here uses the quarterly data over the period 1959Q3 to 1996Q4.
Variables that appear in (3) are measured as follows. Real money balances (m) are the log of
nominal M2 deﬂated by the GDP deﬂator; scale variables are the logs of real GDP and real
consumer spending. All income and price data used are chain-weighted. R is the four-to-six-
month commercial paper rate; RM2 is the weighted average of the explicit rates paid on the
components of M2. The bond rate (R10) used later is the nominal yield on ten-year Treasury
bonds. The data on household holdings of bond and equity mutual funds is from the Board of
Governors and is constructed by adding net assets of mutual funds but netting out institutional
and IRA/Keogh balances (Collins and Edwards 1994).
4 Instrumental variables are used to estimate money demand regressions. Instruments used
are just lagged values of the right-hand side explanatory variables. Ordinary least squares are not
used mainly out of concern for the simultaneity bias. Both procedures yield similar estimates of
the long-run parameters, even though estimates of short-run parameters differ. The convergence
condition is usually rejected if ordinary least squares are used, but that is not the case with instru-
mental variables. That result favors instrumental variables. Nevertheless, the Hausman statistic
(Hausman 1978) that tests the hypothesis that ordinary least squares estimates of all parameters
are identical to those using the instrumental procedure is small, indicating that simultaneity may
not be a serious problem.                   
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Table 1 Instrumental Variable Estimates of M2 Demand Regressions:
1960Q4 to 1989Q4
Regression A M2 Demand without the Bond Rate
¢mt = ¡0.05 + 0.23 ¢mt¡1 + 0.08 ¢mt¡2 + 0.45 ¢ct + 0.24 ¢ct¡1
(4.3) (2.9) (1.0) (4.3) (3.6)
¡0.002 ¢(R ¡ RM2)t ¡ 0.003 ¢(R ¡ RM2)t¡1 ¡ 0.11 mt¡1 + 0.11 ˜ yt¡1
(1.6) (3.7) (4.6) (4.6)
¡0.002 (R ¡ RM2)t¡1 ¡ 0.72 Tt + 0.03 D83Q1
(3.8) (4.2) (5.5)
CRSQ = 0.78 SER = 0.0047 Q(2) = 1.5 Q(4) = 5.1 Q(29) = 22.6
Nc = Ny = 1.0 L(R¡RM2) = ¡0.02
F1(2,105) = 0.99
Regression B M2 Demand with the Bond Rate
¢mt = ¡0.05 + 0.26 ¢mt¡1 + 0.08 ¢mt¡2 + 0.40 ¢ct + 0.26 ¢ct¡1
(4.2) (3.5) (1.1) (4.2) (4.0)
¡0.002 ¢(R ¡ RM2)t ¡ 0.004 ¢(R ¡ RM2)t¡1 ¡ 0.11 mt¡1 + 0.11 ˜ yt¡1
(1.5) (4.0) (4.4) (4.4)
¡0.002 (R ¡ RM2)t¡1 ¡ 0.63 Tt + 0.03 D83Q1 ¡ 0.005 (R10 ¡ RM2)t¡1
(3.1) (3.3) (5.2) (0.7)
¡0.002¢(R10 ¡ RM2)t¡1
(1.5)
CRSQ = 0.79 SER = 0.0045 Q(2) = 1.5 Q(4) = 5.2 Q(29) = 26.9
Nc = Ny = 1.0 L(R¡RM2) = ¡0.02 L(R10¡RM2) = ¡0.004
F1(2,105) = 0.99 F2(2,105) = 2.24
Notes: m is real M2 balances; c is real consumer spending; ˜ y is (yt + yt¡1)/2 where y is real
GDP; R is the four-to-six-month commercial paper rate; RM2 is the own rate on M2; R10 is the
nominal yield on ten-year U.S. Treasury bonds; D83Q1 is a dummy that equals 1 in 83Q1 and 0
otherwise; ¢ is the ﬁrst difference operator. All variables are in their natural logs, except interest
rate variables. CRSQ is the corrected R-squared; SER is the standard error of regression; Q(k) the
Ljung-Box Q-statistic based on k number of auto correlations of the residuals. Ny is the long-
term income elasticity; Nc is the long-term consumption elasticity; N(R¡RM2) is the long-term
opportunity cost parameter. F1 tests the restriction Ny = Nc = 1; F2 tests the restriction that
the bond rate spread variables are not signiﬁcant in the regression (the 5 percent critical value
is 3.1). Instruments used for estimation are just lagged values of the right-hand side explanatory
variables. The reported coefﬁcient on trend is to be divided by 1,000.        
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the version estimated using real consumer spending as the short-run scale vari-
able and real GDP as the long-run scale variable. The evidence reported in
Mankiw and Summers (1986), Small and Porter (1989), and Mehra (1992)
indicates that in the short run changes in real money balances are correlated
more with changes in consumer spending than with real GDP.5 The regression,
however, is estimated under the assumption that the long-run scale elasticity
is unity, computed using either the long-run part or the short-run part of (3).
That is, restrictions (4) and (5) are imposed on equation (3). In addition, the
regression includes a deterministic time trend and a dummy for the introduction
of superNows and money market deposit accounts.6
As can be seen, the coefﬁcients that appear on the scale and opportunity
cost variables have theoretically correct signs and are statistically signiﬁcant.7
F1 tests the restrictions that long-run income and consumer spending elastic-
ities are unity. This F-statistic is small, indicating that those restrictions are
consistent with data (see Table 1). The long-run opportunity cost parameter is
¡0.02, indicating that a 1 percentage point increase in M2’s opportunity cost
(R ¡ RM2) from its current level would reduce equilibrium M2 demand by
about 2 percent. It is also worth noting that the long-run part of the money
demand equation is well estimated. In particular, the estimated error-correction
coefﬁcient is correctly signed and signiﬁcant, indicating the presence of a co-
integrating M2 relation in the pre-1990 period.
Evidence on the Missing M2 during the 1990s
Panel A in Table 2 presents the dynamic, out-of-sample predictions of M2
growth from 1990Q1 to 1996Q4. Those predictions are generated using the
standard M2 demand regression given in Table 1. Actual M2 growth and pre-
diction errors (with summary statistics) are also reported. As shown in the
5 I prefer to work with this speciﬁcation because the restrictions that the long-run scale
elasticity computed using either the long-run part or the short-run part is unity are consistent
with the data in this speciﬁcation. Those restrictions are usually found to be inconsistent with
the data when instead real GDP is used in the short-run part. Nevertheless, the results here are
not sensitive to the use of different scale variables in short- and long-run parts of the money
demand equation. In particular, with real GDP in the short-run part we still have the episode of
the missing M2 from 1990 to 1994 and the result that M2 growth was on track in the years 1995
and 1996.
6 In the empirical money demand literature, time-trend variables generally proxy for the
effect of ongoing ﬁnancial innovation on the demand for money. Estimates reported in many
previous studies indicate that the statistical signiﬁcance of trend variables in money demand
regressions is not robust across different speciﬁcations and sample periods. For example, a time
trend when included in the Federal Reserve Board M2 demand model is signiﬁcant (Small and
Porter 1989; Duca 1995; Koenig 1996), whereas that is not the case in speciﬁcations reported in
Hetzel and Mehra (1989) and Mehra (1991, 1992). Different sample periods used in these studies
may account for these different results.
7 The Ljung-Box Q-statistics presented in Table 1 indicate that serial correlation is not a
problem.       
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table, this money demand regression overpredicts M2 growth from 1990 to
1994. Those prediction errors cumulate to an overprediction in the level of M2
of about $490 billion, or 14 percent, by the fourth quarter of 1994.8
However, since 1995 M2 growth has been in line with that predicted by the
money demand regression. The cumulative over prediction in the level of M2
has stabilized and there is no tendency for the level percent error to increase
since then (see panel A in Table 2). This evidence indicates that the leftward
shift in the public’s M2 demand seen early in the 1990s may have ended.
2. AN EXPLANATION OF THE MISSING M2
Portfolio-Substitution Hypothesis
It is widely held that weak M2 growth observed in the early ’90s is due to
household substitutions out of bank deposits (in M2) and into long-term ﬁnan-
cial assets including bond and stock mutual funds.9 Two developments may
have contributed to such portfolio substitution. One is the increased availabil-
ity and liquidity of bond and stock mutual funds brought about by reductions
in transaction costs, improvements in computer technology, and the introduc-
tion of check writing on mutual funds. The other is the steepening of the
yield curve brought about mainly by a reduction in short-term market interest
rates in general and bank deposit rates in particular.10 It is suggested that the
combination of these factors reduced the public’s demand for savings in the
form of bank deposits, leading them to redirect savings balances into long-term
ﬁnancial assets including bond and stock mutual funds.11
8 This predictive failure is conﬁrmed by formal tests of stability. The conventional Chow test
with the shift date (1978Q4) located near the midpoint of the sample period indicates that the M2
demand regression is unstable from 1960Q4 to 1996Q4. The Dufour test (Dufour 1980), which
is a variant of the Chow test, examines stability over the particular interval, 1990Q1 to 1994Q4.
This test uses an F-statistic to test the joint-signiﬁcance of dummy variables introduced for each
observation over 1990Q1 to 1994Q4. The results here indicate that the individual coefﬁcients that
appear on these shift dummies are generally large and statistically signiﬁcant. The F-statistic is
large and signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level. (The F-statistic, however, is not signiﬁcant at the 5
percent level.) Together these results indicate that the M2 demand regression is not stable over
this interval.
9 Darin and Hetzel (1994), Wenninger and Partlan (1992), Feinman and Porter (1992), Collins
and Edwards (1994), Orphanides, Reid, and Small (1994), Duca (1995), and Koenig (1996). Wen-
ninger and Partlan (1992) argued that weakness in M2 growth was due to weakness in its small
time deposits component.
10 Many analysts have argued that the decline in the size of taxpayers’ subsidy to the de-
pository sector also may have contributed to a reduction in offering rates on bank deposits. It is
argued that rising premiums for deposit insurance, higher capital requirements, and more stringent
standards for depository borrowing and lending in both wholesale and retail markets may have
pressured many banks and thrifts to widen intermediation margins, resulting in lower offering
rates on many bank deposits (Feinman and Porter 1992).
11 It may, however, be noted that bond and stock funds also grew rapidly in the mid ’80s,
shortly after IRA, 401k, and Keogh regulations were liberalized. Such growth, however, did not       
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Tests in Previous Studies
The portfolio-substitution hypothesis outlined above has been tested in two dif-
ferent ways. The ﬁrst one attempts to internalize such substitutions by adding
bond and/or stock mutual funds to M2. Duca (1995) adds bond funds to M2 and
ﬁnds the expanded M2 more explainable from 1990Q3 to 1992Q4. Darin and
Hetzel (1994) shift-adjust M2, and Orphanides, Reid, and Small (1994) simply
add bond and stock funds to M2. While the resulting monetary aggregates do
explain part of the missing M2 or improve the predictive content of M2 in the
missing M2 period, they worsen performance in other periods.12
The other approach attempts to capture the increased substitution of mutual
funds for bank deposits by redeﬁning the opportunity cost of M2 to include
the long-term bond rate. This approach assumes that the bond rate is a proxy
for the return available on long-term ﬁnancial assets including bond and stock
mutual funds. Hence M2 demand is assumed to be sensitive to both short- and
long-term interest rates (Feinman and Porter 1992; Mehra 1992; Koenig 1996).
This approach has been relatively more successful in explaining the missing
M2 than the other one discussed above.
The main issue here however is whether the character of M2 demand has
changed since 1990. In Koenig (1996) long-term interest rates are found to
inﬂuence M2 demand even before the period of missing money, suggesting
that the character of M2 demand did not change and that standard M2 demand
regressions estimated without the long-term interest rate are misspeciﬁed. In
contrast the empirical work in Feinman and Porter (1992) and Mehra (1992)
are consistent with the observation that long-term interest rates did not add
much towards explaining M2 demand in pre-1990 sample periods. In the next
section I examine further the quantitative importance of the long-term interest
rate in explaining M2 demand.
3. THE ROLE OF THE BOND RATE IN M2 DEMAND
Pre-1990 M2 Demand Regression with the Bond Rate
Panel B in Table 1 presents the standard M2 demand regression augmented to
include the bond rate spread variable measured as the difference between the
nominal yield on ten-year Treasury bonds and the own rate of return on M2.
destablize M2 demand. The ﬂow-of-funds data discussed in Duca (1994) indicates that the assets
that households shifted into bond and equity funds came from direct holdings of bonds and
equities rather than from M2 deposits. By contrast more of the inﬂows into bond and stock funds
in the early ’90s reﬂected shifts out of M2 rather than out of direct bond and equity holdings.
12 For example, Orphanides, Reid, and Small (1994) report that money demand equations
that add bond and stock funds to M2 fail Chow tests of stability. Koenig (1996) shows that the
bond-fund adjusted M2 demand equation, while it improved the forecast performance from 1990
to 1994, worsened performance in the early sample period. I show later (see footnote 16) that
adding bond and stock funds to M2 worsened performance over the last couple of years.           
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I include both the level and ﬁrst differences of this spread. The regression is
estimated over the pre-missing M2 demand period, 1960Q4 to 1989Q4. It is
evident that the coefﬁcient that appears on the level of the bond rate spread
variable is small and statistically not different from zero. F2 is the F-statistic
that tests the hypothesis that coefﬁcients that appear on both the level and ﬁrst
differences of the bond rate spread variable are zero. This statistic is small,
indicating that the bond rate spread did not inﬂuence M2 demand in the pre-
1990 period (see regression B in Table 1).
Including the bond rate spread in the M2 demand regression estimated
using only pre-1990 sample observations does not solve the missing M2 puzzle
either. The evidence on this point is indicated by the dynamic out-of-sample
simulations of M2 demand given in panel B of Table 2. The augmented M2
demand regression continues to overpredict M2 growth from 1990 to 1994.
Those prediction errors cumulate to an overprediction in the level of M2 of
about $464 billion, or 13.2 percent by end of 1994. Including the bond rate
spread does yield a somewhat lower root mean squared error, but this im-
provement is very small (compare prediction errors in panels A and B of
Table 2).13
Full-Sample M2 Demand Regression with the Bond Rate
Table 3 presents M2 demand regressions estimated including post-’90 sample
observations. In regression D the bond rate spread enters interacting with a
slope dummy that is unity since 1989 and zero otherwise. In that speciﬁcation
the restriction that the bond rate spread did not inﬂuence M2 demand in the
pre-1990 period is imposed on the regression. I also present the regression C
13 In the money demand regression above, long- and short-rate spreads are included in an
unrestricted fashion. It is possible to get the result that the bond rate inﬂuenced M2 demand
even before the missing M2 demand period if the opportunity cost of holding M2 is alternatively
measured as a weighted average of long- and short-rates:
OCt = (w ¤ R10t + (1 ¡ w) ¤ RCPt) ¡ RM2t,
where OCt is the opportunity cost; w is the weighting coefﬁcient; and other variables are deﬁned
as before. If w = 0, then the bond rate is not relevant in inﬂuencing M2 demand.
The money demand regression (3) here also is estimated using this alternative measure.
Estimation results using pre-1990 sample observations indicate that the standard error of M2
demand regression is minimized when w = 0.4. In that regression the opportunity cost variable is
correctly signed and signiﬁcant, indicating that the long-term interest rate inﬂuenced M2 demand
even before the missing M2 demand period. This ﬁnding is similar to the one reported in Koenig
(1996). However, this empirical speciﬁcation does not solve the missing M2 problem. M2 growth
predicted by this regression remains large relative to actual M2 growth from 1990 to 1994. Those
prediction errors still cumulate to generate an overprediction in the level of M2 of about $441
billion, or 12.6 percent by end of 1994. The magnitude of this prediction error is somewhat
smaller than the one generated by assuming w = 0. But the improvement is small. This empirical
speciﬁcation does not solve the missing M2 problem because the increased explanatory power of
the bond rate in the M2 demand regression comes at the cost of the short rate.                   
Y. P. Mehra: Recent Behavior of M2 Demand 37
Table 3 Instrumental Variables Estimates of M2 Demand Regressions:
1960Q4 to 1996Q4
Regression C M2 Demand with the Bond Rate, but No Slope Dummies
¢mt = ¡0.01 + 0.33 ¢mt¡1 + 0.13 ¢mt¡2 + 0.36¢ct + 0.17 ¢ct¡1
(2.1) (4.8) (1.9) (3.9) (2.7)
¡0.001¢(R ¡ RM2)t ¡ 0.005 ¢(R ¡ RM2)t¡1 ¡ 0.03 mt¡1 + 0.03 ˜ yt¡1
(0.9) (5.9) (2.4) (2.4)
¡0.000 (R ¡ RM2)t¡1 ¡ 0.000 (R10 ¡ RM2)t¡1 ¡ 0.004 ¢(R10 ¡ RM2)t¡1
(0.3) (0.1) (3.2)
¡0.51 Tt + 0.02 D83Q1
(3.0) (5.1)
CRSQ = 0.78 SER = 0.0047 Q(2) = 2.7 Q(4) = 6.6 Q(29) = 35.1
Ny = Nc = 1 N(R¡RM2) = ¡0.005 N(R10¡RM2) = ¡0.005
F2(2,133) = 5.5¤
Regression D M2 Demand with the Bond Rate Interacting with Slope Dummy
¢mt = ¡0.03 + 0.25 ¢mt¡1 + 0.08 ¢mt¡2 + 0.49 ¢ct + 0.18 ¢ct¡1
(3.8) (3.5) (1.1) (5.2) (2.8)
¡0.002 ¢(R ¡ RM2)t ¡ 0.003 ¢(R ¡ RM2)t¡1 ¡ 0.07 mt¡1 + 0.07˜ yt¡1
(1.5) (4.2) (3.9) (3.9)
¡0.001(R ¡ RM2)t¡1 ¡ 0.002 (D ¤ R10 ¡ RM2)t¡1 ¡ 0.003 ¢(R10 ¡ RM2)t¡1
(2.5) (3.2) (2.1)
¡0.56 Tt + 0.02 D83Q1
(3.6) (5.3)
CRSQ = 0.77 SER = 0.0046 Q(2) = 1.7 Q(4) = 6.0 Q(36) = 35.3
Ny = Nc = 1 N(R¡RM2) = ¡0.02 N(R10¡RM2) = ¡0.03
*Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
Notes: D is a dummy that is 1 from 1989Q1 to 1996Q4 and 0 otherwise. N(R10¡RM2) is the
long-run bond rate opportunity cost parameter. See also notes in Table 1.
in which no such slope dummy is included. Both differences and the level
of the bond rate spread are included in these regressions. As can be seen,
the coefﬁcient that appears on the level of the bond rate spread is signiﬁcant        
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only in the regression where the spread is included interacting with the slope
dummy.14 Moreover, in that regression other coefﬁcients, including the one
that appears on the error-correction variable, have expected signs and are sta-
tistically signiﬁcant. In contrast none of the coefﬁcients that appear on levels
of the interest rate spreads are signiﬁcant in the regression without the slope
dummy (compare coefﬁcients in regressions C and D of Table 3).15 Together
this evidence indicates that a signiﬁcant role for the impact of the long-term
interest rate on M2 demand emerges only in the post-1990 period.16
Panel D in Table 4 presents the dynamic, within-sample simulations of M2
growth from 1990 to 1996 generated using the regression with the slope dummy.
As shown in the table, this regression can account for most of the missing M2
since 1990. The prediction errors now cumulate to an overprediction in the
level of M2 of about $41 billion, or 1.2 percent by end of 1994. Since then,
the level percent error has displayed no tendency to increase over time. This
14 The intuition behind this result is that the least squares regression coefﬁcient measures the
average response of M2 demand to the spread variables over the full sample. If for most of the
sample period—as is the case here—this response is small or zero, then the estimated regression
coefﬁcient that simplify averages such responses over the full sample will be small or zero. But
when the slope dummy is included, the estimated regression coefﬁcient receives full weight over
part of the sample over which the response is believed to be strong.
I have not reported the slope dummy on the ﬁrst difference of the bond rate spread because
it is not signiﬁcant in the regression.
15 In the regression C without the slope dummy, the error-correction coefﬁcient is small in
magnitude and only marginally signiﬁcant. In fact, if restrictions that long-run scale elasticities
are unity are not imposed on the regression, then none of the coefﬁcients that appear on levels of
variables are signiﬁcant. Hence in these regressions the hypothesis that there exists a cointegrating
M2 demand relation is easily rejected. This ﬁnding is similar in spirit to the one in Miyao (1996),
where it is shown that once post-’90 sample observations are included in the estimation period,
evidence supports no M2 cointegration.
16 Alternatively, the hypothesis that most of the missing M2 went into bond and stock mutual
funds can be tested by broadening the deﬁnition of M2 to include such mutual funds. If the hy-
pothesis is correct, then the broadly deﬁned monetary aggregate should be more explainable from
1990 to 1994. This procedure yields similar results. To explain it further, consider the behavior of
the monetary aggregate that simply adds bond and stock mutual funds to M2, denoted hereafter
as M2+ (Orphanides, Reid, and Small 1994). This aggregate has grown at the following rates
(in percent) in recent years: 4.1 in 1990, 6.2 in 1991, 4.6 in 1992, 5.5 in 1993, 0.9 in 1994,
6.3 in 1995, and 7.9 in 1996. For those years M2 growth predicted by the standard M2 demand
regression is 6.4, 3.5, 6.4, 4.8, 3.0, 3.5, and 3.9, respectively. The corresponding prediction errors
are ¡2.3, 2.0, ¡1.7, 0.6, ¡2.0, 2.9, and 3.9. As can be easily veriﬁed, for the period 1990 to
1994 the mean prediction error is ¡0.57 percentage point and the root mean squared error is 2.0
percentage points. These prediction errors are smaller than those generated using the narrowly
deﬁned M2; for the latter the mean error is ¡1.78 and the root mean squared error is 2.52.
Thus M2+ is more explainable over the period 1990 to 1994 than is M2. However, adding bond
and stock funds to M2 does not yield a more stable money demand equation. As can be seen,
strong growth in M2+ over the period 1995 to 1996 is not easily predicted when conventional
money demand parameters are used to characterize M2+ demand. The analysis above, however,
is subject to the caveat that the opportunity cost variable in M2+ demand is different from the
one that shows up in M2 demand. In particular, the own rate of return on M2+ must include the
returns on bond and stock mutual funds.                 
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evidence indicates that the steepening of the yield curve contributed to weak
M2 growth in the early ’90s.
The Missing M2 and Bond and Stock Mutual Funds
Figure 1 charts the missing M2 as explained by the bond rate spread since
1990.17 It also charts the cumulative change (since 1989) in household holdings
of bond and stock mutual funds.18 As can be seen, these two series comove
from 1990 to 1994. But this comovement ends in the years 1995 and 1996.
Furthermore, in the beginning years (1990, 1991, 1992) of this missing period,
the magnitude of the missing M2 somewhat exceeds the cumulative increase
in household holdings of bond and stock mutual funds. This data supports the
view that weak M2 growth in the early ’90s is due to household’s substitution
out of M2 and into bond and stock mutual funds. But not all of the missing
M2 ﬁrst went into bond and stock funds. A part might have gone into direct
holdings of bonds, stocks, and other long-term savings vehicles (Duca 1993;
Darin and Hetzel 1994).
If part of the missing M2 ended up in bond and stock mutual funds, then
changes in missing M2 balances should be correlated with changes in house-
hold holdings of bond and stock funds. This implication is tested by running
the following regression:
¢BSt = a0 + a1¢BSt¡1 + a2¢MM2t + ²t,
where BS is household holdings of bond and stock funds; MM2 is the missing
M2; and ²t is the random disturbance term. The series on BS and MM2 are
reported in Table 4 and charted in Figure 1. Estimation results indicate that
from 1991Q1 to 1994Q4 a2 6= 0, but from 1991Q1 to 1996Q4 a2 = 0.19 These
results are consistent with the hypothesis that part of the missing M2 during
the 1990s ended up in bond and stock mutual funds.
17 The series on the missing M2 is generated in the following way. The M2 demand regres-
sion D, which includes the bond rate interacting with a slope dummy, is estimated from 1960Q4
to 1996Q4. This regression is dynamically simulated from 1990Q1 to 1996Q4, ﬁrst using actual
values of the bond rate spread over the prediction interval and then repeating the simulation with
actual values of the bond rate set to zero. The difference in predicted values so generated gives
M2 demand explained by the bond rate.
18 This series is constructed by Collins and Edwards (1994) and is the plus part of the
monetary aggregate (M2+) discussed in the previous footnote. As noted before, the plus part is
the market value of household holdings of bond and stock mutual funds. The current deﬁnition
of the conventional M2 aggregate includes currency, demand deposits, other checkable deposits,
savings deposits, small time deposits, retail money market mutual funds and overnight RPs, and
Eurodollar deposits. Since this deﬁnition does not include institutional and IRA/Keogh balances,
household holdings of bond and stock funds are also net of such assets. However, unlike M2,
those household holdings can increase if bonds and stocks appreciate and thus do not necessarily
represent funds out of new savings.
19 The regressions use quarterly observations on year-over-year changes in BS and MM2 and
are run from 1991Q1 to 1996Q4.     
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Figure 1 The Missing M2 and the Cumulative Change in Household
Holdings of Bond and Stock Mutual Funds since 1990



















Cumulative Change in Household Holdings￿
of Bond and Stock Mutual Funds
+
￿
Notes: The missing M2 is the reduction in M2 demand that is due to the bond rate spread.
Household holdings are net of institutional and IRA/Keogh assets.
4. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
It is now known that the public’s demand for M2 experienced a leftward shift
in the early ’90s. It is widely believed that this shift reﬂected the public’s
desire to redirect savings balances from bank deposits to long-term ﬁnancial
assets, including bond and stock mutual funds. In this article, I test this pop-
ular hypothesis. In particular, I present evidence that a standard M2 demand
regression augmented to capture the impact of the long-term interest rate on
money demand can account for most of the missing M2 since 1990 and that
changes in this missing M2 are highly correlated with changes in household
holdings of bond and stock mutual funds in the early 1990s.
The evidence here, however, also indicates that the long-term interest rate
has no predictive content for M2 demand in the pre-missing M2 period. That
result suggests caution in assigning a causal role to the independent inﬂuence of
the long-term rate on M2 demand found in the missing M2 period. Furthermore,
household holdings of bond and stock mutual funds continued to increase in
the years 1995 and 1996, but that increase has not accompanied any weakness    
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in M2. Hence increases in household holdings of bond and stock mutual funds
may not necessarily signal instability in M2 demand.
One interpretation of the recent behavior of M2 demand is that some special
factors caused a leftward shift in the public’s M2 demand. The evidence here
is consistent with the view that those special factors included the combination
of the unusual steepening of the yield curve and the increased availability,
liquidity, and public awareness of bond and stock mutual funds. The evidence
so far is that those special factors have not changed fundamentally the charac-
ter of M2 demand beyond causing a one-time permanent shift in the level of
M2 balances demanded by the public. Hence the result that the leftward shift
in M2 demand ended two years ago should now be of interest to monetary
policymakers.
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